Volume 62
Issue 6 v. 62, Tolle Lege

Article 2

6-15-2018

Using Root Case Analysis To Study Prosecutorial Error: A
Collaboration Between The Montgomery County (Pennsylvania)
District Attorney's Office And The Quattrone Center For The Fair
Administration Of Justice
Steven E. Raper
Lee A. Fleisher
David L. Mayer
Risa V. Ferman
Kevin Steele

See next page for additional authors

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Steven E. Raper, Lee A. Fleisher, David L. Mayer, Risa V. Ferman, Kevin Steele & John Holloway, Using Root
Case Analysis To Study Prosecutorial Error: A Collaboration Between The Montgomery County
(Pennsylvania) District Attorney's Office And The Quattrone Center For The Fair Administration Of Justice,
62 Vill. L. Rev. 13 (2018).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol62/iss6/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Villanova Law Review by an authorized editor of Villanova
University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository.

Using Root Case Analysis To Study Prosecutorial Error: A Collaboration Between
The Montgomery County (Pennsylvania) District Attorney's Office And The
Quattrone Center For The Fair Administration Of Justice
Authors
Steven E. Raper, Lee A. Fleisher, David L. Mayer, Risa V. Ferman, Kevin Steele, and John Holloway

This article is available in Villanova Law Review: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol62/iss6/2

Raper et al.: Using Root Case Analysis To Study Prosecutorial Error: A Collabor
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW: TOLLE LEGE

CITE: 62 VILL. L. REV. TOLLE LEGE 13

USING ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS TO STUDY PROSECUTORIAL ERROR:
A COLLABORATION BETWEEN THE MONTGOMERY COUNTY
(PENNSYLVANIA) DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE AND THE
QUATTRONE CENTER FOR THE FAIR ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
STEVEN E. RAPER, MD, JD; LEE A. FLEISHER, MD; DAVID L. MAYER, PHD; THE
HONORABLE RISA V. FERMAN; KEVIN STEELE, JD; & JOHN HOLLWAY, JD
I.

INTRODUCTION

P

rosecutors are expected to be more than advocates enforcing the criminal
laws of a particular jurisdiction; they are ministers of justice.1 District
attorneys’ (DA’s) offices across the country constantly strive to manage their
caseloads with the highest reliability, accuracy, and integrity, representing not
only victims of crime and their families, but also the community at large. Many
prosecutors’ offices also oversee criminal investigations and provide legal
guidance and charging decisions to law enforcement personnel. This provision
of oversight and guidance requires the creation and maintenance of policies,
procedures, and standards that enforce the laws, while protecting the rights of
victims and the rights of those accused of crimes, and ensuring fairness to all.
Put differently, it is not enough to charge and convict those who have
committed crimes; any prosecutors’ office must also maintain the highest
ethical standards and conduct itself in a manner that is above reproach and
complies with all laws and constitutional mandates.
In a criminal investigation related to the alleged rape of an unconscious
victim, members of the investigative team misread a laboratory report. The
interpretive error was presented during a court proceeding and to a Magisterial
District Justice during a preliminary hearing. Once the interpretive error was
discovered, the District Attorney concluded that the case presented to the court
proceeding was unintentionally corrupted and could not proceed,
notwithstanding her conclusion that there was sufficient independent evidence
to support most of the charges. This conclusion led the District Attorney to
withdraw the charges as filed. In addition, the District Attorney concluded that
the interpretive error impaired the ability of the Montgomery County District
Attorney’s Office to prosecute the case or effectively serve as a minister of
justice, causing the Office to refer the investigation to the Office of the Attorney
General (AG) of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania for consideration of
whether new charges should be re-filed against the defendant.2 In order to learn
1. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r 3.8 cmt. (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983),
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_
professional_conduct/rule_3_8_special_responsibilities_of_a_prosecutor/comment_on_rule_3
_8.html [https://perma.cc/MD56-GYQQ] (noting prosecutors have obligations to see
defendants get procedural justice, sufficient evidence is present to decide guilt, and innocents
receive special precautions to prevent or rectify conviction).
2. See Martha Neil, Prominent Attorney Now Faces AG Prosecution of Rape Case,
After Charges Were Dropped in March by DA, A.B.A. J., (Apr. 25, 2014, 4:15 PM),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/prominent_attorney_now_faces_ag_prosecution_of_r
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from this error, and in furtherance of the prosecutor’s ethical obligations of
(a) conviction integrity, (b) transparency and accountability, and (c) a culture of
continuous self-improvement within the Office, the District Attorney partnered
with the interdisciplinary Quattrone Center for the Fair Administration of
Justice at the University of Pennsylvania Law School to conduct a Root Cause
Analysis (RCA) of the error. The goal of the RCA was to identify specific
activities, policies, procedures, and environmental factors that allowed the error
to occur, and to implement changes that would prevent similar errors from
occurring in the future. In this way, the District Attorney sought to promote the
highest levels of accuracy, reliability, fairness, accountability, and integrity in
the handling of criminal cases throughout her office and the law enforcement
community.
A. The Parties
1.

The Montgomery County District Attorney’s Office

The Montgomery County District Attorney’s Office (DA’s Office) is
comprised of forty-five attorneys, forty-two support staff, and fifty-seven
detectives and investigators. The District Attorney is considered the Chief Law
Enforcement Officer of the county in which he/she is elected to serve. Cases
are referred to the District Attorney by forty-nine local police departments and
the Montgomery County Detective Bureau (MCDB), which is a part of the
DA’s Office. In 2015, the Office brought 9,107 cases to final disposition, a
number that has remained fairly stable for the past several years.
2.

The Quattrone Center for the Fair Administration of Justice

A national leader in the application of a systems approach to error
reduction in the administration of justice, the Quattrone Center for the Fair
Administration of Justice at the University of Pennsylvania Law School
comprises investigators from the fields of medicine, transportation, and law.
Each member of the team has experience in conducting RCAs in his/her
respective field.
B. Process
Given the number and complexity of cases handled by any DA’s office, it
is to be expected that human errors will occur. There is no reliable source of
data as to error rates for all criminal convictions. Given the relative lack of data
regarding errors in law enforcement, a comparison can be drawn to a more
robust dataset in healthcare. The Department of Health and Human Services
Office of Inspector General found that 0.6% of Medicare beneficiaries had a
National Quality Forum (NQF) Serious Reportable Event, 1.0% had a Medicare
Hospital Acquired Condition (HAC) event, and 13.1% experienced an adverse

ape_case_after_charges_were/ [https://perma.cc/MY9W-486G].
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event resulting in one of the four most serious categories of patient harm. 3 Like
healthcare and other complex industries (e.g., aviation), criminal justice
professionals and those in the communities they serve should also strive for
zero errors. Errors in the administration of justice may allow the perpetrator of
a crime to escape accountability for his/her actions or could incarcerate an
innocent person. Either of these outcomes is unacceptable. 4
The current rate of human error in criminal justice is unknown, and
reasonable minds may differ as to the acceptable rate of human error in the
administration of justice. Even so, it seems clear that responsible criminal
justice professionals should be dedicated to the goal of preventing such errors
wherever possible, which requires learning from errors that do occur and
putting in place processes to prevent or mitigate errors. Error-reduction
strategies are thus one element essential to maintaining the trust and support of
the public that law enforcement is sworn to serve.
In addition to actual errors with impact on the prosecutors, investigators
and others involved, there is a related class of error, the near miss. A near miss
may describe what the DA’s Office experienced in this case. Since no one was
wrongfully convicted, one could view this as a near miss; on the other hand,
since an individual was charged, in-part, based on misinterpreted evidence, one
could view this as an error. Either way, additional review was warranted to
avoid repeating an undesirable result. A near miss in healthcare has been
defined by the NQF as “an event or a situation that did not produce patient
harm.”5 The National Transportation Safety Board has a similar definition in
aviation: “[A]n occurrence . . . associated with the operation of an aircraft,
which affects or could affect the safety of operations.”6
The interpretive error during investigation of the criminal case described in
this document, however, did affect the outcome in a very public manner. As a
result, the Montgomery County District Attorney sought an objective and
thorough review of the case, along with practical recommendations for process
and environmental improvements that could be implemented within the Office.
She requested that the Quattrone Center provide expertise in Root Cause
Analysis (RCA) to satisfy these goals.
The Quattrone Center assembled an RCA team, consisting in-part of the
authors of this paper, who collectively have experience in criminal procedure
and in conducting RCAs in healthcare and transportation environments. The
RCA team met with an investigation team created by the District Attorney,
consisting of the District Attorney, First Assistant District Attorney (ADA),

3. See Daniel R. Levinson, Adverse Events in Hospitals: National Incidence Among
Medicare Beneficiaries, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. 15, (Nov. 2010),
http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-06-09-00090.pdf [https://perma.cc/VD84-F2B9].
4. See THOMAS PYZDEK & PAUL KELLER, SIX SIGMA HANDBOOK 3 (4th ed. 2014)
(discussing industrial concept of six sigma; that error rates greater than one in 3.4 errors per
million opportunities are considered unacceptable).
5. See NQF Patient Safety Terms and Definitions, Nat’l Quality Forum,
https://www.qualityforum.org/Topics/Safety_Definitions.aspx [https://perma.cc/2EY6-ZE9M]
(last visited Nov. 13, 2016).
6. See 49 C.F.R. § 830.2 (2016) (emphasis added).
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Chief County Detective, and Deputy Chief County Detective, to review the
investigative and prosecutorial components of the case. Based on the facts
provided by the DA’s investigative team, and applying the principles of RCA
and just culture event reviews articulated in this document, the RCA team
identified specific areas for evaluation by the DA’s Office and created a
recommended action plan to reduce the possibility of future error. A primary
focus was placed upon investigation management and supervision, evidentiary
analysis, case workload, teamwork, and communication. The DA and her
senior management reviewed the recommendations of the RCA team and
consulted with the RCA team on issues of implementation and communication
within the Office to ensure a contextual fit between the implementation of the
recommendations and the culture of the Office.
II. PRINCIPLES OF QUALITY IMPROVEMENT AND THEIR APPLICATION TO
CRIMINAL JUSTICE
Before proceeding to the application of RCA to criminal justice, it is useful
to develop a vocabulary classifying various types of unintended outcomes that
may occur in complex human systems, such as healthcare, that have benefitted
from RCA as a quality improvement tool. Error can be either the failure of a
planned action to be completed as intended or the use of a wrong plan to
achieve an aim.7 Defined in this way, errors are generally unintentional
(negligent, accidental, or otherwise unavoidable), while misconduct can be
thought of as the intentional or reckless conduct of an individual or group of
individuals. In healthcare, the term sentinel events is used to describe
unexpected occurrences—or the risk thereof—involving “death or serious
physical or psychological injury.”8 Such events signal the need for immediate
investigation and response, as does any process for which a “recurrence would
carry a significant chance of a [similar] serious adverse event.” 9 The terms
error and sentinel event are not synonymous. Not all sentinel events occur
because of an error, and not all errors result in sentinel events. A related
definition is that of the near miss: a variation in process that did not affect—but
for which a recurrence could increase—the chance of an undesired or adverse
outcome.10
Applying these terms to the administration of criminal justice, it becomes
clear that much of the research on errors in criminal justice to date has focused
on errors at the conviction stage of a criminal adjudication. In a study
conducted by Gould and associates, for example, two categories were defined
for factually-innocent defendants who were indicted for violent felonies but
subsequently relieved of all legal responsibility. 11 The paper used “erroneous
7. See JAMES REASON, HUMAN ERROR 9 (1990).
8. See NQF Patient Safety Terms and Definitions, supra note 5.
9. See id.
10. See Larry E. Poniatowski, Patient Safety and Error Reductions Standards: The
JCAHO Response to the IOM Report, in THE PATIENT SAFETY HANDBOOK 131 (Barbara J
Youngberg & Martin J Hatlie eds., 2004).
11. See Jon B. Gould et al., Predicting Erroneous Convictions: A Social Science
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convictions” to describe defendants exonerated after conviction, 12 and defined
“near misses” as those cases in which defendants had charges dismissed or
acquitted before conviction on the basis of “factual innocence.” 13 Factual
innocence, in turn, required both acknowledgement that the defendant did not
commit the crime and evidence that would convince a reasonable person that
the individual did not commit the crime. 14
To improve the criminal justice system, errors in criminal justice should be
defined more broadly than the academic focus to date might suggest. This
broader definition would include as error, for example, an incorrect allegation
of criminal behavior that prevented law enforcement from further investigation
of that behavior, as occurred in the case discussed infra, whether such allegation
was “wrongful” in the sense of being intentional or reckless or merely
“erroneous” in the sense of being inaccurate but made in good faith at the time
it was made. In both instances, an adverse event—an outcome unintended by a
perfectly efficient criminal justice system—occurred.
To identify the
appropriate actions necessary to effectively prevent the future recurrence of the
adverse event, a more detailed understanding of the actors, the environment,
and the motives behind the decisions made that led to the adverse event is
required.
III. ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS
Although systems and processes may need to be tailored to customs within
local organizations, the basic principles of systems improvement have proven to
be generalizable not only across organizations, but across industries, and
lessons learned from their application have proven to be widely applicable.
RCA has been used productively not only throughout the healthcare industry,
but also in aviation, manufacturing, and other quality-minded industries to
conduct event reviews that lead to actionable change of policies and procedures
to reduce the occurrence of adverse events. 15 The use of RCA in healthcare is
more recent, beginning with its use by the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs
(VA) and the Joint Commission in the mid-1990s.16 With implications for law
Approach
to
Miscarriages
of
Justice
38–39
(Dec.
2012),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/241389.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7QFT-JX6Y]
(identifying ten factors that reportedly separated conviction errors from near misses).
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. See generally Root Cause Analysis, AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RES. & QUALITY
(July
2016),
https://psnet.ahrq.gov/primers/primer/10/root-cause-analysis
[https://perma.cc/9275-675Z] (discussing root cause analysis in healthcare industry); FAA
OFFICE OF AVIATION MED., Root Cause Analysis of Rule Violations by Aviation Maintenance
Technicians
FED.
AVIATION
ADMIN.
(May
31,
2002),
http://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/maintenance_hf/library/documents/media/human_factors
_maintenance/root_cause_analysis_of_rule_violations_by_aviation_maintenance_technicians.
pdf [https://perma.cc/5LF2-4EZ8] (discussing root cause analysis in aviation industry).
16. See Albert W. Wu et al., Effectiveness and Efficiency of Root Cause Analysis in
Medicine, 299 J. AM. MED ASS’N 685, 685 (2008); see also James P. Bagian et al., The
Veterans Affairs Root Cause Analysis System in Action, 28 JOINT COMM’N J. QUALITY
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enforcement at the state and federal level, the Veterans Health Administration
(VHA) has mandated that all VA RCA be submitted to the National Center for
Patient Safety (NCPS), so that the NCPS can review and analyze data about
serious adverse events from RCA data from across the country. 17
The goal of RCA is to learn from adverse events and “near misses” and to
implement proactive change in order to reduce further similar events that might
compromise—in the case of the law—lab report or opinion integrity. 18 An
important feature of the RCA is that it is a blame-free analysis: “[b]laming and
punishing for errors that are made by well-intentioned people . . . drives the
problem of iatrogenic harm underground and alienates people who are best
placed to prevent such problems from recurring.” 19 Given its formality, RCA is
typically reserved for high- to moderate-impact events occurring with
occasional to moderate frequency. 20 The primary concept of RCA is to identify
underlying systems problems (“blunt-end errors”) that increase the likelihood of
errors, while avoiding the trap of focusing on mistakes by front-line individuals
who participated in the event (“sharp-end errors”).21 The nexus of the RCA
process is a multidisciplinary meeting of the investigation team, during which
information collected by the RCA facilitator is presented, analyzed, and
discussed with those individuals who were present at the event. 22 In a criminal
justice context, “sharp-end errors” may be those made by police, law
enforcement investigators, or trial attorneys, while “blunt-end errors” may be
those attributed to supervisors, policies, practices, office environment, etc.
The RCA process is designed to answer four basic questions:
(1) What happened?
(2) Why did it happen?
(3) What are the contributing factors? and,
(4) What can be done to prevent it from happening again? 23
The RCA should lead to the creation of an action plan for process
improvement that will prevent the adverse event or events from recurring in the
future. The RCA is typically conducted by a team of individuals with specific
IMPROVEMENT 531, 531 (2002).
17. See Alexandra Lee et al., Root Cause Analysis of Serious Adverse Events Among
Older Patients in the Veterans Health Administration, 40 JOINT COMM’N J. QUALITY &
PATIENT SAFETY 253, 254 (2014).
18. See A. Zachary Hettinger et. al., An Evidence-Based Toolkit for the Development of
Effective and Sustainable Root Cause Analysis System Safety Solutions, 33 J. HEALTHCARE
RISK MGMT. 11, 11–20 (2013).
19. See William B. Runciman et al., Error, Blame, and the Law in Health Care – An
Antipodean Perspective, 138 ANN. INTERNAL MED. 974, 974 (2003).
20. See Patient Safety Primer: Root Cause Analysis, AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RES.
QUALITY
(July
2016),
http://www.psnet.ahrq.gov/primer.aspx?primerID=10
[https://perma.cc/R6KX-ZCWW] [hereinafter AHRQ RCA Primer].
21. See REASON, supra note 7, at 9.
22. See Davide Nicolini et al., Policy and Practice in the Use of Root Cause Analysis
to Investigate Clinical Adverse Events: Mind the Gap, 73 SOC. SCI. & MED. 217, 221 (2011).
23. See Root Cause Analysis: Tracing a Problem to Its Origins, MINDTOOLS,
http://www.mindtools.com/pages/article/newTMC_80.htm
[https://perma.cc/S5D5-Y6U3]
(last visited Nov. 13, 2016).
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expertise in the environment and activities that were conducted around the
adverse event(s), as close as possible in time to the occurrence.24 The RCA
team seeks to analyze the events from the perspective of the participants, based
on their real-time knowledge of facts and circumstances, to avoid any
retrospective bias that might negatively impact the ability of the RCA team to
objectively identify modifications that will effectively prevent the recurrence of
the adverse event(s). The action plan generated by the RCA team reports on the
redesign of systems and the implementation of improvements designed
specifically to (1) reduce the risk of recurrence for the specific adverse events
that occurred and (2) monitor the effectiveness of the proposed improvements.
As a result, it is expected that the RCA will lead to recommendations that are
materially different from those that would be generated from a disciplinary
review board focused on the direct punishment of individual actors involved in
the incident under review.
An essential tenet of RCAs is that they are conducted in a blame-free
manner. The sole focus of the RCA is the identification of acts, omissions, or
environmental factors that limit the ability of the system in question reliably to
achieve desired outcomes. While information allowing for the review of the
performance of individual participants in the adverse event may be facilitated
by the RCA investigation, such performance reviews, and any attendant
disciplinary action, take place separately and apart from the RCA investigation
itself. This focus on safety (that is, reliable performance of the system as
intended) as opposed to punishment is necessary to maximize the gathering of
useful information from event participants, who might have an incentive to
withdraw from the event review if their participation could lead to disciplinary
measures. It is important to stress that an RCA should be led by a facilitator,
someone outside of executive leadership who is responsible for establishing
action plans for all responsible parties.25 At the same time, organizations
conducting RCAs recognize that professionals whose actions are intentional or
reckless should be held accountable for their actions. Thus, RCAs should
happen within the context of a “just culture” that applies appropriate
professional standards to the relevant workplace. A “just culture” can be
defined as a culture that “recognizes that competent professionals make
mistakes and acknowledges that even competent professionals will develop
unhealthy norms (shortcuts, ‘routine rule violations’), but has zero tolerance for
reckless behavior.”26 One way to blend the need for event reviews that
prioritize safety with a just culture is to have the RCA team refer intentionally-

24. See Patricia M. Williams, Techniques for Root Cause Analysis, 14 BAYLOR UNIV.
MED.
CTR.
PROC.
154,
154
(2001),
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1292997/pdf/bumc0014-0154.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V6BC-CRDD].
25. See Guidance for Performing Root Cause Analysis (RCA) with Performance
Improvement Projects (PIPs), API, https://www.cms.gov/medicare/provider-enrollment-andcertification/qapi/downloads/guidanceforrca.pdf [https://perma.cc/L37U-M4BE] (last visited
Nov. 13, 2016) [hereinafter RCA Guidance].
26.
Glossary: J, AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RES. & QUALITY,
https://psnet.ahrq.gov/glossary/j [https://perma.cc/3DEE-65TB] (last visited Nov. 13, 2016).
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or recklessly-injurious activity to a separate disciplinary process within the
organization.27
A. Elements of a Successful RCA
Local, state or federal institutions of the law should strive to be highreliability organizations (HROs). 28
HROs rely on five hallmarks:
(1) preoccupation with failure, (2) refusal to oversimplify, (3) sensitivity to
operational change, (4) resilience in the face of error, and (5) deference to
expertise.29 Within this context, there are a number of elements that should be
included in a successful RCA, including organizational and structural elements,
review of proposed solutions and implementation, education of relevant
stakeholders, thorough analysis of policy changes, and checks on compliance.
Foremost, an effective organization develops processes for selecting events
requiring an RCA.30 In general, sentinel events—among the most serious—
should be selected for RCA.31 Organizational leadership must provide a charter
to communicate the goals of the RCA, 32 and the RCA facilitator should be
appointed by—but not a member of—leadership, to avoid chilling the open
communication from staff that is necessary for change.33
RCAs assess particular elements of a system or process for the purpose of
reducing errors and making constituents safer.34 Given the effort involved in
bringing an RCA to fruition, the events chosen are generally of a serious
nature35 and may require referral to external committees. RCAs may also
include debriefs with attorneys or staff involved after certain errors to identify
points in the prosecution where interventions could have prevented a problem
and to provide feedback. Importantly, these reviews are not duplicative of the
typical “internal affairs” review and, in the hands of experienced RCA
reviewers, are likely to generate different questions, and therefore different

27. An example of this can be seen in the accident investigations conducted by the
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), which takes the leadership position in the
investigation of aviation, rail, and other transportation accidents instead of the FBI or other
law enforcement organizations. The NTSB’s sole focus is on improving the safety of the U.S.
transportation network. If, during the course of an investigation, the NTSB identifies the
likelihood of criminal behavior, however, it will refer the investigation to the FBI and then
take a “second-chair” role in the event review.
28. See Mark R. Chassin & Jerod M. Loeb, High-Reliability Health Care: Getting
There
from
Here,
91
MILBANK
Q.
459,
461–62
(2013),
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3790522/pdf/milq0091-0459.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8BKP-B78V].
29. See KARL E. WEICK & KATHLEEN M. SUTCLIFFE, MANAGING THE UNEXPECTED:
SUSTAINED PERFORMANCE IN A COMPLEX WORLD 7 (3d ed. 2015).
30. See RCA Guidance, supra note 25.
31. See Chassin & Loeb, supra note 28, at 461–62.
32. See AHRQ RCA Primer, supra note 20.
33. See id.
34. See PATIENT SAFETY: A CASE-BASED COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE xiv (Abha Agrawal
ed., 2014).
35. See Tommaso Bellandi et al., Human Factors and Ergonomics in Patient Safety
Management, in HANDBOOK OF HUMAN FACTORS AND ERGONOMICS IN HEALTH CARE AND
PATIENT SAFETY 679 (Pascale Carayon ed., 2d ed., 2012).
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information. The RCA process is designed to shift analyses of errors toward a
human-factors engineering approach; a search for system dysfunction rather
than human error or other less actionable causes.36
The context in which reviews are conducted and the expertise of the team
members are two critical factors that deserve significant thought. Follow-up of
specific RCA reviews, especially those conducted by external committees,
increases the complexity of implementing change. External reviews risk
abrogation of responsibility from the RCA team or others in the work group,
causing the underlying issue to be lost to follow-up. Ideally, domain experts
from areas of concern will be embedded with the RCA team or asked to assist in
error analysis and solution development. Reviews that are performed
transparently are likely to create sustainable and effective changes in culture.
The best reviews are performed and shared with all interested stakeholders. A
critical function of the RCA team is to ensure assignments of implementation of
recommendations as well as follow-up oversight of the implementation;
otherwise, the RCA process will fail to correct errors.37
Learnings from the RCA should be disseminated to all relevant individuals
throughout the organization as soon as practicable after potentially-repeatable
errors are identified. A critical task is closing the feedback loop and creating an
environment focused on error reduction.
The cost and time needed to implement an RCA are typically reasonable
and certainly can be viewed as important investments in office management,
given the importance of preventing errors. While changes to organizational
structural elements occasionally require substantial, facility-wide investments
involving significant capital outlay, time, and resources, such investments are
the exception rather than the rule for RCA error-reduction solutions. Examples
include new IT platforms or additional office space for incremental hires.
Location is important—for example, in medicine, ambulatory care and inpatient
care have different spectra of errors.38 Within the criminal justice system,
prosecutors, defense attorneys, police officers, and judges can each be expected
to be susceptible to different types of errors. Because most prosecutors’ officebased RCA teams will not possess specific expertise in RCA, such teams should
consider the use of consultants such as the Quattrone Center or other objective
third parties with experience prior to implementing any large-scale, high cost
solutions.39 Although some jurisdictions prohibit public access to criminal
investigative records, consultants may still be able to provide valuable insight
36. See Bagian et al., supra note 16, at 545.
37. See Julius Cuong Pham et al., ReCASTing the RCA: An Improved Model for
Performing Root Cause Analyses, 25 AM. J. MED. QUALITY 186, 187 (2010).
38. See generally Traber Davis Giardina et al., Root Cause Analysis Reports Help
Identify Common Factors in Delayed Diagnosis and Treatment of Outpatients, 32 HEALTH
AFF. 1368 (2013).
39. There is a potential political benefit to the office in seeking assistance from outside
consultants in the review—such a review is likely to be perceived as more independent, and
thus, its conclusions are likely to be seen as more objective and trustworthy by observers
(media, etc.) who might otherwise continue to criticize the office for managing the
investigation internally. However, in Pennsylvania, only law enforcement personnel may
review criminal investigative information.
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regarding administrative and structural issues.
B. Education and Counseling Solutions
Organizations need to provide continuing educational opportunities and
performance feedback to staff that facilitate—and to the extent possible
participate in—RCA teams.40 There are going to be solutions where education
is the primary goal, which may focus on individuals or groups. Training may
focus on educating staff regarding a new technology. Education may also
consist of lectures and testing of attorneys and staff in a more formal didactic
setting. Common examples include orientation of new staff members, learning
in simulated environments, educational “minutes” during staff meetings, or
educational updates regarding existing legal policies and procedures.
Educational solutions work best where a knowledge deficit was identified as an
important causative factor. For example, there may be cases in which staff
members did not know how to analyze evidence or are unaware of changes in
relevant statutory law. Education should not address a serious system problem
such as poor workflow, confusing interfaces with law enforcement, inefficient
processes, or poorly designed policies. Single education sessions, e.g. training
modules during new staff orientation, are unlikely to provide sustained error
reduction, especially if policies and procedures taught during orientation do not
match the “real world” settings in which the errors may arise. Educational
solutions should focus on methods that incorporate contexts in which errorprone situations may occur and environmental simulation where it is safe to
learn failure. Educational solutions ideally are continuing events, as the
knowledge base is lost if not refreshed.
C. Counseling for Error: The Second Victim
Once the RCA has been conducted and the facts surrounding the event in
question are known, management of the organization must counsel individuals
within the organization on how to avoid recurrence of the error(s). Counseling
focuses on individuals who participated in the generation of the error(s) and
typically involves providing constructive feedback, plans for personnel
development, or ultimately referral out of the RCA framework for disciplinary
review and action. Counseling recommendations are generally directed to
involved personnel and may be couched in terms like “all involved staff were
counseled on relevant policies and procedures.” Such solutions are diminished
by focusing only on those individuals who were involved in the adverse event
under review, as these individuals may be the least likely to repeat the same
errors.
If an individual was acting recklessly or without regard to safety processes,
then, according to principles of a just culture, there may be a role for
40. See Paul Bowie et al., Training Health Care Professionals in Root Cause Analysis:
A Cross-Sectional Study of Post-Training Experiences, Benefits and Attitudes, 13 BMC
HEALTH SERVS. RES. 50, 57 (2013), http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/13/50
[https://perma.cc/46WV-KL9T].
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sanctions.41 But most individual errors are a result of slips or lapses that can be
reduced or eliminated only through better systems and process design. 42
Counseling of only affected personnel will have limited to no effect on other
individuals who are at risk of similar error-prone situations. Counseling
typically has negative connotations and may adversely impact personnel’s
willingness to report errors that did not affect justice. Counseling—in a
different light—is important for “second victims,” defined as personnel
experiencing feelings of guilt, shame, and depression, and should be provided in
the immediate post-event period.
Professionals in many industries with zero tolerance for errors may suffer
with the realization that their conduct contributed to or caused an error that led
to an adverse event or injury to another human being. Although there is a
scarcity of published data on the effects of errors on criminal justice
professionals, the data on medical errors and unanticipated bad patient
outcomes on healthcare workers can be instructive. A culture of “shame and
blame” has been thought to affect healthcare quality by decreasing error
reporting.43 Blame-related distress may also be a factor in burnout, compassion
fatigue, and, especially, the second victim syndrome. 44 Support resources
provided by healthcare organizations to prevent and reduce second victimrelated harm often are inadequate. 45 One analysis identified six stages in the
natural history of the second victim phenomenon: “(1) chaos and accident
response, (2) intrusive reflections, (3) restoring personal integrity, (4) enduring
the [investigation], (5) obtaining emotional first aid, and (6) moving on.”46
Training is necessary, but insufficient, to inoculate professionals against
the effects of making errors—especially single-incident training. Counseling
should be provided not only to the individuals involved, but to anyone who
might make the same error. Counseling might include managing out of the
organization or other sanctions if behaviors were intentional, reckless, or
grossly negligent. Managers should be aware that protecting good faith actors
and sanctioning bad faith actors is important to cultural acceptance of any just
culture analysis, implemented process, or proposed reform.
The prevalence of second victims after an adverse event has been reported
41. See SIDNEY DEKKER, JUST CULTURE: BALANCING SAFETY AND ACCOUNTABILITY
87–99 (2012).
42. See James Reason, A Systems Approach to Organizational Error, 38 ERGONOMICS
1708, 1710–12 (1995); see also REASON, supra note 7, at 9.
43. See Judy E. Davidson et al., Workplace Blame and Related Concepts: An Analysis
of
Three
Case
Studies,
148
CHEST
543,
543
(2015),
http://journal.publications.chestnet.org/article.aspx?articleID=2289067
[https://perma.cc/XX54-C7MY].
44. See id. at 546 (citing B.J. Horak et al., Crossing the Quality Chasm: Implications
for Health Services Administration Education, 21 J. HEALTH ADMIN. EDUC. 15 (2004)).
45. See generally Jonathan D. Burlison et al., The Second Victim Experience and
Support Tool (SVEST): Validation of an Organizational Resource for Assessing Second
Victim Effects and the Quality of Support Resources, 00 J. PATIENT SAFETY 2014,
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4342309/ [https://perma.cc/QZ89-TNZF].
46. See S.D. Scott et al., The Natural History of Recovery for the Healthcare Provider
“Second Victim” After Adverse Patient Events, 18 QUALITY SAFETY HEALTH CARE 325, 325,
326, 329 tbl.5 (2009).
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variably from 10.4% to 43.3%.47 The coping strategies used by second victims
have an impact on their patients, colleagues, and themselves. After the adverse
event, defensive as well as constructive changes have been reported in practice.
The second victim phenomenon may also have a significant impact on
clinicians, colleagues, and subsequent patients.48
At one time or another, virtually all physicians make a medical error that
harms a patient.49 At such times, the physician can feel singled out, exposed,
worried that others have noticed, and concerned about potential ramifications.
There is agony about what to do, who to tell, what to say. Thoughts of the
event may become intrusive. One questions one’s competence, but fears being
discovered. Physicians (as well as lawyers) have an ethical requirement to
disclose errors depending on the circumstance, but fears of punishment and of
the patient’s reprisal are associated with dread.50
In a survey of 1,160 healthcare providers, 15% had experienced patient
safety events causing personal problems in the aftermath of the error, including
depression, anxiety, or concerns about their ability to perform their jobs as a
result of an adverse event. Of these, 39% seriously contemplated leaving their
profession.51 In a follow-up study, the same authors found that 30% of 898
clinicians had experienced emotional distress after a major adverse event within
the previous year.52 Hanan H. Edrees and colleagues found that two-thirds of
140 clinicians surveyed at a patient safety meeting had experienced emotional
problems related to an adverse event. 53 Guilt, responsibility, and failure were
common feelings in healthcare providers after a patient’s death, even when not
due to medical error.54 7,905 members of the American College of Surgeons
were asked whether they had experienced suicidal ideation within the past year,
and 501 (6.3%) said “yes,” and suicidal ideation was strongly associated with
medical error.55 1,294 Norwegian physicians were similarly studied, and 368
(28%) were involved in an adverse clinical event. Of those, 17% reported a
significant impact upon their personal lives. 56 Clinical symptoms may include
anxiety, sleeplessness, difficulty concentrating, depression, a feeling of loss of

47. See Deborah Seys et al., Health Care Professionals As Second Victims After
Adverse Events: A Systematic Review, 36 EVALUATION & HEALTH PROFS. 135, 146 (2013)
(citing three separate studies on second victims in health care).
48. See id. at 149.
49. See Wu et al., supra note 16, at 727.
50. See id.
51. See Scott et al., supra note 46, at 328 tbl.4.
52. See Susan D. Scott et al., Caring for Our Own: Deploying a Systemwide Second
Victim Rapid Response Team, 36 JOINT COMM’N J. QUALITY & PATIENT SAFETY 233, 234
(2010).
53. See Hanan H. Edrees et al., Health Care Workers As Second Victims of Medical
Errors, 121 POLISH ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 101, 108 (2011).
54. See Farnaz M. Gazoni et al., Life After Death: The Aftermath of Perioperative
Catastrophes, 107 ANESTHESIA & ANALGESIA 591, 597 tbl.2 (2008).
55. See Tait D. Shanafelt et al., Special Report: Suicidal Ideation Among American
Surgeons, 146 ARCHIVES SURGERY 54, 56 (2011).
56. See O.G. Aasland & R. Førde, Impact of Feeling Responsible for Adverse Events
on Doctors’ Personal and Professional Lives: The Importance of Being Open to Criticism
From Colleagues, 14 QUALITY SAFETY HEALTH CARE 13, 15 (2005).
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personal integrity, and irritability. 57 As a bridge from medical studies to the
justice system, similar types of stressors affect the police. 58 One study
documented that 63% of police respondents stated that a critical incident
debriefing would be beneficial following an extremely stressful event related to
duty.59
D. Providing Assistance After the Error or Adverse Event
Although there is a dearth of literature on the effects of errors on
prosecutors, by analogy, there are data on other professions such as medicine.
After making errors, healthcare professionals would like support in a variety of
ways. One study of family medicine physicians is instructive. 60 Of twentyseven physicians surveyed, seventeen (63%) wished to talk with someone who
would be nonjudgmental about the error.61 Sixteen (59%) wanted affirmation of
competence as a healthcare professional by reviewing the event. 62 Thirteen
(48%) hoped for validation of the fateful decision, and eight (30%) wanted
affirmation of their personal self-worth.63 Pratt and colleagues have developed
a toolkit to help healthcare organizations support healthcare providers who may
suffer from the emotional impact of medical errors. The toolkit consists of ten
modules, each consisting of specific actions, best evidence references, and
examples.64
Organizations can help deal with both the adverse event and its aftermath. 65
Organizational efforts may include blame-free, process-oriented, analysis of
systems errors to help alleviate self-blame and doubt. Organizations should
offer support to healthcare providers after errors or bad outcomes. Individuals
who provide assistance (employee assistance programs, wellness counselors)
should make clear that a need for support is not a sign of weak character.
Education about the legal process might reduce anxiety should a claim be
anticipated. The role of the risk managers should be presented in advance,
preferably before an error or bad outcome, so the healthcare team knows how to
utilize risk management services. Lastly, training or retraining where
appropriate might empower the affected individuals to get past the event. One

57. See Andrew A. White & Thomas H. Gallagher, After the Apology—Coping and
Recovery After Errors, 13 AM. MED. ASS’N. J. ETHICS 593, 594–95 (2011),
http://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/2011/09/pdf/ccas1-1109.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2LX2K5N9].
58. See Matthias Berking et al., Enhancing Emotion-Regulation Skills in Police
Officers: Results of a Pilot Controlled Study, 41 BEHAV. THERAPY 329, 337–38 (2010).
59. See generally Holly M. Robinson et al., Duty-Related Stressors and PTSD
Symptoms in Suburban Police Officers, 81 PSYCHOL. REP. 835 (1997).
60. See generally Marc C. Newman, The Emotional Impact of Mistakes on Family
Physicians, 5 ARCHIVES FAM. MED. 71 (1996).
61. See id. at 71.
62. See id.
63. See id.
64. See generally Steven Pratt et al., How to Develop a Second Victim Support
Program: A Toolkit for Health Care Organizations, 38 JOINT COMM’N J. QUALITY &
PATIENT SAFETY 235 (2012).
65. See CHARLES VINCENT, PATIENT SAFETY 139–51 (1st ed. 2006).
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commentator has suggested that sharing one’s own perceived errors may also
help provide support.66
Policy learnings generated by an RCA typically are focused on
reinforcement of existing policies and procedures or changes to individual
policies without significant change to underlying processes, physical
environment, or information systems. A common example is to reinforce
knowledge of personnel on existing or recently changed policies via circulars,
newsletters, e-mails, or meetings. Frequently, personnel can confirm attendance
by a sign-in sheet. For example, district attorney’s offices may send a memo to
all assistant DAs to remind them of policies regarding evaluation of laboratory
or other complex evidence. Policy changes alone, however, without significant
changes to the education of individuals, are likely to have limited effectiveness
and/or sustainability. RCA teams can implement larger sets of changes that
make policy solutions more likely to be sustainable and effective. Policies
designed to reinforce reasoned process changes may be instituted concomitantly
with appropriate education and needed changes to IS infrastructure or
workspace. Top-down organizational policy changes mandated that lack
supporting effort are unlikely to create effective change. Further, RCA
solutions that require significant administrative efforts (i.e., enforcement and
compliance) have high costs to be sustainable and effective. Invariably, new
organizational priorities surface, and there is only so much that can be
monitored and reported upon without devoting more resources or reallocating
existing resources.
Compliance with RCA solutions is focused on reviews of case files or
other metrics for the purpose of monitoring or regulating procedural success.
Data allow an organization to evaluate what works and what does not.
However, it is wrong to conclude that only measurement is important in
management.67 Compliance checks may consist of audits, for example, where
personnel are observed to verify they are subjecting evidence to external
analysis or verifying victim DNA identification. Observations may give a sense
of what is being done, but observations frequently suffer from the Hawthorne
effect, the name for a phenomenon by which variables not accounted for in
social or behavioral experiments exert unexpected influence when workers
know they are being observed.68 As a result, observed rates of compliance
should be assumed to be lower in non-observed workflow. Successful
implementation rates also characteristically drop to a baseline after compliance
checks are no longer, especially if there was no accompanying change to
education or environment. Case file reviews for compliance are retrospective,
robust sources of data, but labor-intensive, consuming significant human and
other resources. Such reviews often give little meaningful feedback to
personnel on how to improve the system. Organizations should calculate the
66. See Newman, supra note 60, at 73.
67. See W. EDWARDS DEMING, THE NEW ECONOMICS FOR INDUSTRY, GOVERNMENT,
EDUCATION 35 (2d ed. 2000).
68. See Daniel Nelson, Book Review, 53 J. ECON. HIST. 209, 209–10 (1993)
(reviewing RICHARD GILLESPIE, MANUFACTURING KNOWLEDGE: A HISTORY OF THE
HAWTHORNE EXPERIMENTS (1991)).
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downstream effects of any long-term compliance commitments or reporting
requirements; they can quickly trump limited time resources, such that more
time is spent reporting than in actively decreasing errors.
IV. THE MONTGOMERY COUNTY RCA
A. Case Sequence of Events
According to court documents, the victim attended a social gathering with
colleagues from work and was driven home by her employer. She recalled his
bringing a bottle of wine into the vehicle and offering her a glass. She largely
lost consciousness for the rest of the evening, with only a few spotty memories
of events. She woke up the next morning with soreness and multiple bruises on
her body as well as significant gaps in her memory about the events of the
previous night. Her memories led her to believe that she had been sexually
assaulted, and she had family members take her to the hospital one and a half
days later. The hospital treated her injuries, performed a sexual assault
examination, and took samples for testing.
Later that week, the victim contacted law enforcement and told them what
happened to her. The victim initially went to the Upper Merion Police
Department. When they learned the substance of her allegations, they contacted
the MCDB, who took over the case and formally interviewed her. In the days
following her statement to law enforcement, she was contacted by the hospital
and verbally given some of the test results. Her understanding of the verbal test
results, based on a conversation with hospital staff, was that zolpidem, a “date
rape drug,” had been detected in her system in trace amounts. After speaking
with the hospital staff, the victim contacted an investigator with the MCDB to
advise the investigator of her conversation about the test results. Law
enforcement subsequently obtained additional medical records from the hospital
as well as the lab report containing the test results for zolpidem.
The lab that performed the tests was not the lab usually used by the District
Attorney’s Office, so the Deputy District Attorney (DDA) and Detective
managing the investigation were not accustomed to the format of the results.
When the Deputy District Attorney and Detective reviewed the report, they saw
a listing for zolpidem and a quantity they interpreted as suggesting an
identifiable amount of zolpidem, rather than a zero that would indicate no
amount. As understood by the DDA and Detective, the test results appeared
consistent with the victim’s reported conversation with hospital staff. This lab
report was written such that it led the Deputy District Attorney and Detective to
believe there were trace elements of zolpidem in the victim’s blood when, in
fact, there were none. The DNA analysis showed the suspect’s DNA on the
button of the victim’s pants and on the inside of the waistband of her
underwear. The hospital exam showed clear injuries indicative of forceful
vaginal penetration, which were consistent with sexual assault.
The suspect was a local politician who was the chairman of the political
party with which the elected District Attorney was affiliated. Though she felt
no personal conflict of interest in handling a case involving this man, the

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2018

15

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 62, Iss. 6 [2018], Art. 2

28

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62: p. 13

District Attorney was concerned about the appearance of a conflict of interest
and the potential public perception that a conflict could exist. To avoid the
appearance of impropriety, the District Attorney referred the investigation to the
Office of the Attorney General of Pennsylvania. In her letter to the Attorney
General (AG), the DA requested the AG take over the case based upon the
potential appearance of a conflict of interest. At the same time, she directed her
staff to continue the investigation so that no evidence would be lost, and she
assigned a county detective and an experienced deputy district attorney as the
team for investigating this high-profile case. The Pennsylvania Attorney
General declined to assume the case, so it fell to the District Attorney to make
charging decisions and prosecute the case, if necessary.
Additional investigation was conducted, including investigative interviews
with the suspect and others. The investigation was submitted to the
Montgomery County Investigating Grand Jury. Included in the presentation of
evidence to the Grand Jury was the lab report, which was described as reflecting
trace amounts of zolpidem in the victim’s blood. The Grand Jury voted and
issued a presentment recommending to the District Attorney that she file
charges against the suspect. The District Attorney accepted the presentment
and recommendation of the Grand Jury and authorized the filing of a criminal
complaint against the defendant. The defendant was arrested and arraigned for
rape of an unconscious victim and related charges.
The case progressed in customary fashion through the court system. The
Commonwealth presented its case at a preliminary hearing, at which time
certain evidence was presented, including the lab report. The detective testified
that the report demonstrated that an identifiable level of zolpidem had been
found within the victim’s blood. As a result, the charges against the defendant
were held for court. As part of pretrial discovery, the deputy district attorney
sent a copy of the lab report to the defense attorney. Upon reviewing the report,
the defense attorney informed the deputy district attorney that he could not find
the alleged level of zolpidem listed within the report. As a result, the
Commonwealth quickly consulted with experts and determined that it had
misinterpreted the report which, in fact, did not indicate the presence of
zolpidem and brought this concern to the attention of the deputy district
attorney, who then shared it with the District Attorney. The District Attorney
directed her staff to review the matter, and all agreed that the analysis of the lab
report previously conducted by the office was in error. The District Attorney
also considered the various instances in which this erroneous interpretation had
been represented by the DA’s Office, including its presentation to the Grand
Jury, its inclusion in the criminal complaint, and its introduction as evidence
during a preliminary hearing. There was no suggestion that the error was
intentional on the part of any individual; in fact, defense counsel advised the
DA that he believed it was entirely unintentional. Given all of the preceding
facts, however, the DA believed that she had no choice but to dismiss the
charges and start from the beginning. At that point, the DA concluded that her
office had an actual conflict of interest in reconsidering the matter, and she
referred the case to the Office of the Attorney General for the second time. This
second referral, unlike the first, was based upon an actual conflict of interest
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cited by the DA. The Attorney General accepted the referral and took over the
case. The Attorney General’s Office reviewed the investigation and made its
own independent charging decision, refiling most of the same charges that had
originally been filed. The defendant eventually pled no contest to misdemeanor
indecent assault.69
B. RCA Procedural Framework
The RCA team assembled by the Quattrone Center for the Fair
Administration of Justice consisted of two healthcare professionals, an
anesthesiologist and a general surgeon, with experience in RCAs in a healthcare
environment; one employee of the National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB) with experience as an investigator of transportation accidents; and one
attorney familiar with the workings of prosecutors’ offices. The RCA team met
with the investigative team created by the DA’s Office to investigate the
incident in question, which consisted of the District Attorney, the First Assistant
District Attorney, the Chief County Detective, and the Deputy Chief County
Detective of the MCDB, which exists within the District Attorney’s Office.
Facilitation for the RCA was provided by the Quattrone Center members.
The RCA team conducted a thorough interview of the Investigative Team
to get a detailed chronology of events leading up to and including the
investigational error and to understand the conclusions of the Investigative
Team regarding the motivations and situational understandings held by the
ADA and her investigator throughout their management of the case. The RCA
Team created a chronology of the case investigation from the commission of the
criminal events through the discovery of the error. Based on the interview with
the Investigative Team and subsequent follow-up sessions, the RCA Team
identified several factors that were believed to contribute to the creation of an
environment that allowed the investigative error to occur, to be used in
charging, and to be shared with the public and with defense counsel. The RCA
Team organized these areas, along with specific factors within each area, in an
Ishikawa or “fishbone” diagram for review by the Investigation Team and
senior management within the DA’s Office (see Figure, below).
Once an agreed upon set of environmental factors was completed, the RCA
Team generated a draft action plan (Table) with proposed actions that would
address active, latent, supervisory, and environmental factors that may have
helped cause the adverse event and presented this draft to senior management in
the DA’s Office. The DA’s Office evaluated the draft action plan and provided
suggested revisions back to the RCA Team, who subsequently provided a final
version back to the DA’s Office. Senior management within the DA’s Office
provided a memo to the County Commissioners explaining the results of the
RCA and seeking their support to implement—qualitatively and with budget

69. See Brad Segall, Former GOP Official in Montco Sentenced for ‘Indecent Contact’
With
Co-Worker
(Nov.
24,
2014,
11:03
AM),
http://philadelphia.cbslocal.com/2014/11/24/former-gop-official-in-montco-sentenced-forindecent-contact-with-co-worker/ [https://perma.cc/RU5R-LKVH].
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assistance—the proposed reforms. This support was given, and the reforms
have been implemented within the DA’s Office.
As part of its recommendations, the RCA Team also provided guidance to
senior management within the DA’s Office on the importance of recommending
reforms that were implementable within the culture and environment of the
DA’s Office and methods for communicating and implementing the proposed
reforms that would maximize their adoption within the DA’s Office. Process
changes that are not embraced by line personnel are per se ineffective in
modifying behavior, and, therefore, will not be effective in eliminating the
recurrence of the adverse event in question.
C. Factors Contributing to Error
The primary factors contributing to error identified by the internal review
involved:
 A failure to accurately interpret the lab report based
upon flawed assumptions made by those initially
reviewing the report and shared with their
supervisors.
This failure included technical
misinterpretation of the lab report on the part of the
deputy district attorney and of the county detective
assigned to the case;
 Atypical communication from the victim with regard
to scientific evaluations of the case;
 Ineffective communication within the team and from
the team to colleagues (informal) and supervisors;
 A lack of independent review of the investigative
team;
 Failure to seek expert assistance to evaluate the lab
report; and
 Pressure caused by external factors such as the
potential conflict of interest due to the suspect’s
position and the concurrent open referral to the
Attorney General’s Office and the intense media
attention the case was generating.
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FIGURE. “FISHBONE” OR ISHIKAWA DIAGRAM USED BY ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS
TEAM.
D. Observations from the RCA Team
1.

Human Factors Related to the Report Contributed to Its Misinterpretation
by the Investigator and ADA

The toxicology report was generated by a laboratory not typically used by
the DA’s Office, as the report had been ordered by the hospital where the victim
first presented, rather than being ordered by law enforcement personnel. As a
result, its format and content were unfamiliar to the assigned investigator and
the ADA, leading to a risk of misinterpretation of information. Furthermore,
the substantive contents of the report were confusing. The report listed the
minimum detectable amount/level necessary for the lab to identify the presence
of zolpidem and indicated that the sample lacked detectable amount of
zolpidem. Unfortunately, neither the assigned Detective nor the Deputy District
Attorney recognized that the report documented no detectable levels of
zolpidem, and proceeded as if the minimum detectable level listed in the report
was instead the amount of zolpidem detected within in the victim’s blood.
2.

Atypical Communications Related to the Report Contributed to Its
Misinterpretation by the Detective and ADA

Normal procedure within the DA’s Office for a toxicology test requested
by law enforcement personnel is for the lab to send the test results back to the
requesting ADA or investigator. In this case, however, because the hospital that
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treated the victim requested testing, hospital personnel received the report and
communicated results to the victim directly. The victim subsequently
communicated her erroneous understanding of the results to the Detective, who
then communicated those same results to the DDA (along with the potential for
confirmation bias, a potential that appears to have been realized).
3.

A Lack of Supervision, Exacerbated by the Environment of Confidentiality
Created by the District Attorney, Had an Unintended Chilling Effect on the
Willingness of the Detective and ADA to Seek Assistance

The DA’s Office has an extensive training program for its ADAs that predates the events described in this paper. Although supervisors within the Office
have an “open door policy” and pride themselves on being available to consult
with ADAs and review cases to ensure high-quality prosecutions, each
individual ADA or investigator is expected to elevate necessary questions or
concerns about any individual case to colleagues and supervisors, rather than
requiring the supervisor to review each specific case.
In this instance, the defendant was a prominent political figure in the
region. As a result, the allegations were the subject of considerable media
scrutiny, and the DA’s Office received a constant stream of calls and questions
regarding the investigation and its status. In addition, the DA and other
supervisors within the DA’s Office were extremely sensitive to the risk that the
community would feel that political considerations might influence the charging
decision, and they were also mindful of the potential harm caused by unfounded
accusations. Thus, the assigned DDA and Detective on the case were instructed
to communicate only with certain supervisors about the investigation. They
were further told not to share information with other colleagues or to
communicate by e-mail. This admonition of confidentiality was intended to
protect both the defendant and victim until all facts had been uncovered. The
instructions had the unintended consequence, however, of reducing the ability
of the DDA and Detective to follow normal practice and review the case with
other personnel within the DA’s Office.
It was and is a consistent part of the daily practice of the DA’s office for
ADAs and detectives to discuss ongoing cases with their colleagues and peers,
creating an informal system of checks, balances, and strategic ideas that may
help to reduce errors. By including others and discussing cases, these law
enforcement professionals get the benefit of the training, experience,
perspective, and knowledge of other highly trained professionals. ADAs and
detectives use their colleagues as additional “eyes” on a problem, to get other
opinions, and to identify factors in the case that the assigned ADA might have
missed or to which improper weight might have been given. In this instance,
the instruction from the DA Office’s leadership to limit intra-Office
communication about the case had the unintended consequence of removing
this case from that informal “peer review” process. As a result, the lab report in
question was not carefully reviewed by other personnel within the office, one of
whom could reasonably have identified the interpretive error before it was
relied upon by the investigative team. There are no facts suggesting that the
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interpretive error regarding zolpidem was intentional. Rather, available
information demonstrates that the ADA and Detective acted in good faith
throughout the case.
V. THE RCA TEAM’S RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE
RCAs are collaborative processes that benefit from a team approach. RCA
investigative team members must be carefully assigned; have clearly defined
roles; continually question facts, hypotheses, and conclusions; and encourage
outside input and supervision throughout the investigation.
Such a
responsibility is necessary to guard against “confirmation bias,” in which an
investigator following a hypothesis gives unwarranted weight to facts that agree
with one’s own hypothesis and/or minimizes or disregards nonconforming facts.
Proper interpretation of data gathered during an investigation is mandatory,
particularly in cases where information is received from multiple, disparate
sources, often in non-standard formats. In the case at issue in this RCA,
inaccurate conclusions were drawn from a single laboratory report.
Contributing factors included an unfamiliar report format, an initial explanation
of the report’s contents coming from a layperson rather than a medical expert,
failure to consult relevant laboratory personnel, and minimal communication
between the investigative team and supervisors caused by concerns over leaks
regarding details about the investigation before its conclusion.
Such
communication failures suggest a role for a “devil’s advocate” independent of
the investigation to further challenge existing assumptions and ensure that all
data is fully tested. Such advocates would also help ensure that charging and
other decisions are based only on provable facts.
ADAs in Montgomery County, like their colleagues in most jurisdictions
throughout the United States, maintain hundreds of active case files
simultaneously, and they bear responsibility for the outcome in each case.
Therefore, measures must be in place to ensure that errors do not occur due to
excessive case management burdens.
A. Implementation of Best Practices
Best practices concerning criminal investigative matters are extremely
challenging to implement, maintain, and enforce in Montgomery County. This
difficulty can be attributed to the existence of forty-nine independent and
largely autonomous police departments within Montgomery County. Only the
MCDB is under the direct management of the DA’s Office, and thus in virtually
all other instances, the implementation of best practices in the investigation of
crime is entirely in the discretion of senior management for the police
department in question. The DA’s Office may directly implement best practices
within the MCDB, but cooperation from police chiefs and the community is
essential to effectuate county-wide changes. Significant measures thought to be
immediately available include refinements in charging decisions, review teams,
and training programs to help ensure accurate and appropriate case outcomes.
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B. Charging Determinations
The DA’s Office often advises law enforcement personnel regarding
charging decisions such as whether criminal offenses should be charged, and if
so, which offenses are appropriate. New policies were implemented so that
supervisory prosecutors—whose duty it is to ensure that charged offenses are
appropriate under the circumstances and supported by sufficient evidence—
advise police requesting consults for charging decisions. Pilot programs,
including training for prosecutors and law enforcement partners were developed
for early case review and prosecutorial approval of charges in the busiest
jurisdictions.
C. Investigative Review Teams
Within the MCDB, review teams were formed to facilitate communication
between personnel, allowing for better critical evaluation regarding
investigative matters. Local criminal procedure rules were adopted so that the
police must obtain prior approval from the DA or an approved ADA for search
warrants and for filing certain criminal charges with regard to sex offense and
homicide cases. Further, documents that contain technical information or other
specialized data require independent review by objective and competent experts
in that specialty before they are used in court or elsewhere. A network of
available experts will be identified and maintained, all of whom are available on
an “as-needed” basis.
D. A Just Culture
The RCA team considered how to integrate a culture that balances
transparency and “blame-free” support of good-faith, conscientious actors—
who may from time to time, nonetheless, make an unintentional mistake—with
individual accountability and an awareness of the complexity of the job.
Learning from errors cannot happen without awareness of errors, which requires
a “just culture” that addresses the mistake and accurately assesses the
responsibility of the individuals involved. Individuals performing their duties in
good faith will be mentored when possible and receive support, thereby
improving the entire system. However, those individuals who act recklessly or
wrongfully will be trained, disciplined, and, when appropriate, terminated from
the District Attorney’s Office.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS ADOPTED BY THE MONTGOMERY
COUNTY DA’S OFFICE
A. Restructuring and Staff Proposals
1.

Bureau Accreditation and Implementation of Best Practices: Chief and
Deputy Chief County Detectives
The RCA identified the need for formal accreditation of the MCDB as part
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of the development of best practices regarding its investigative systems. The
accreditation will be from the Pennsylvania Law Enforcement Accreditation
Program, introduced by the Pennsylvania Chiefs of Police Association in
2001.70 Since then, 300 agencies have enrolled, and 96 agencies have become
accredited, including the Montgomery County Sheriff’s Office and many other
local police departments within the county. The DA’s Office has begun the
process to obtain accreditation for the MCDB.
Accreditation has long been known to help with the evaluation and
improvement in the overall performance of law enforcement organizations. The
keystone of accreditation as an organizational improvement tool lies in the
development of standards setting out clear professional objectives.
Accreditation requires the MCDB to establish an enhanced framework for
evaluating agency practices and procedures. Accreditation has also been shown
to increase employee productivity and reduce the risk of lawsuits, with the
expected decrease in liability insurance expenditures. 71 In short, accreditation
provides a foundation for enhanced public accountability and transparency.
The Chief and Deputy Chief County Detectives were both noted to have
received extensive training concerning law enforcement investigations and
matters related to professionalism. Both are intimately familiar with office
structure, office personnel, and the necessary elements for criminal prosecution.
As such, each of them was deemed capable of identifying best practices to
strengthen the MCDB’s underlying investigations. Further, their existing job
position descriptions provide sufficient independence and authority to
implement necessary best practices within the Bureau.
Therefore, the Chief and Deputy Chief of the Detective Bureau were
assigned main responsibility for establishing and enforcing investigative-related
procedures throughout the Bureau to ensure investigative accuracy and
integrity. Likewise, the Chief and Deputy Chief are also responsible for
obtaining Bureau accreditation from the Pennsylvania Chiefs of Police
Association.
Integrity-related measures have been found to be most effective when
directed toward the entire investigative and prosecutorial process, as significant
criminal investigations often continue after arrest through trial. Investigative
actions that occur within this context can only be addressed in a meaningful
fashion by select personnel, such as the Chief and Deputy Chief, who possess
not only the sufficient authority, but also broad familiarity with office structure,
attorneys, and the necessary mechanics of case prosecution. Traditionally, the
Chief and Deputy Chief have been expected to focus their duties and to direct
their daily activities toward the management of criminal investigations and the
immediate supervision of Bureau personnel. Expanding the responsibilities of
the Chief and Deputy Chief Detective to include identification and
implementation of best practices for improving investigative accuracy and
70.
See PCPA Accreditation Program, PA. CHIEFS OF POLICE ASS’N,
http://www.pachiefs.org/pcpa-accreditation-program [https://perma.cc/9G4D-2FZK] (last
visited Nov. 13, 2016).
71. See id.
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responsibility for accreditation efforts was considered to represent an effective
and appropriate extension of their respective positions.
2.

Deputy District Attorney for Professional Standards

The internal review conducted by the Investigation Team, as well as the
RCA conducted by the RCA Team, suggested that the most effective method to
ensure investigative accuracy and appropriate prosecutorial outcomes would be
to implement systems and controls as front-end system checks. As a result, a
new Deputy District Attorney (DDA) for Professional Standards was
established to implement these checks and was envisioned as an alternative to
the concept advanced by a small number of district attorneys throughout the
county—the formation of Conviction Integrity Units (CIU). CIUs review cases
where newly discovered evidence suggests that an inaccurate conviction might
have occurred. These units are exclusively reactive in nature, and while postconviction reviews are certainly needed, they can only redress past errors.
The RCA further determined that prosecutors have insufficient time to
properly focus on “blunt end” arrest and charging determinations. Additional
experienced, unbiased personnel are needed to adequately conduct case status
reviews before charging decisions are made. Such reviews would ideally
include examination of the sufficiency of case evidence, efforts to ensure
accurate charging, checks on prosecutorial discretion and strategy, and
compliance with legal and ethical obligations. All are necessary to ensure
appropriate outcomes.
In order to effectively ensure the prosecutorial integrity of all criminal
cases, regardless of subject matter or specialization, the DA’s Office established
a Deputy District Attorney (DDA) position responsible for implementing and
enforcing Professional Standards. This DDA serves as an ombudsman,
operating independently from existing units and divisions in order to maintain
objectivity. The DDA has been granted sufficient authority to evaluate all cases
within the Office, implement meaningful review processes, and take necessary
action to ensure appropriate investigative and prosecutorial outcomes. The new
DDA assesses decisions made by prosecutors, including supervisory personnel
and reports directly to the District Attorney and First Assistant District
Attorney.
The Professional Standards DDA satisfies the critical need of front-end
review by reviewing investigative findings and charging decisions. This
individual evaluates cases that have not had the benefit of prior supervisory
review and serves as a resource to address particular complaints or concerns
about specific cases. Finally, this DDA implements procedures to identify and
analyze “near misses,” in an effort to continuously improve existing best
practices.
3.

Assistant Chief of Trials Division, Assistant District Attorney

The Trials Division is the largest Unit within the DA’s Office, consisting
of twenty-nine Assistant District Attorneys. In response to the RCA, the Office
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created a new mid-level supervisory position, Assistant Chief of the Trials
Division. The new Assistant Chief assists the Chief with supervising all
Division personnel and has supervisory authority over the other prosecutors
assisted by eight Unit Captains. Most cases prosecuted within Montgomery
County are assigned to ADAs within the Trials Division. The Division’s
attorneys average in excess of two hundred cases, although some individuals
may be responsible for more than four hundred cases.
The DA’s Office considered whether such caseloads were inappropriate
and might contribute to errors in the administration of justice. Although the
caseloads have remained constant for many years within the DA’s Office, the
management of the office ultimately determined that the appropriate action was
not to increase the number of ADAs substantially. Instead, they chose a more
measured response that would address the issue, while ensuring full attention to
all relevant elements of existing cases. Consequently, the new Assistant Chief
is also tasked with sufficiency of evidence determinations, workload
assessments and serves in a similar “ombudsman” role to the DDA for
Professional Standards, addressing those cases prosecuted within the Trials
Division.
The RCA noted that the first review any ADA has of a criminal case is
often at the file review stage, well after an arrest and shortly before a
defendant’s formal arraignment. At the earliest opportunity, cases require
analysis and a determination on whether all charges are supported by sufficient
evidence. The Assistant Chief of the Trials Unit is the senior level prosecutor
working with the ADAs in the division and is ultimately responsible for making
accurate determinations on sufficiency of evidence. When the evidence is
deemed insufficient, the Assistant Chief exercises discretion not to prosecute.
The Assistant Chief also oversees workload issues to ensure that individual
caseloads are manageable and that each case receives appropriate attention.
The Assistant Chief provides service as “devil’s advocate,” ensuring that cases
are objectively evaluated before proceeding with further prosecution.
Importantly, the Assistant Chief serves as a point of entry for those outside of
the DA’s Office requesting independent review for a specific case. Such
requests might come from a law enforcement officer, a victim, a defense
attorney, or a judge.
B. Long-Term Quality Improvement Initiatives
Measurement is a critical part of testing and implementing change.
Recommendations generated by the RCA are only useful in improving the
safety of a system if they are implemented and evaluated (and hopefully
optimized) over time. Thus, quality improvement efforts focus not on
individual events, but on measuring trends in relevant metrics that validate
whether changes implemented lead to improvement. A combination of
quantitative and qualitative data is more informative than either alone.
The criminal justice system, and prosecutors’ offices in particular, is
largely barren of metrics that evaluate whether a prosecutor or an office is a
high quality minister of justice. Conviction rates and case management rates
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provide some insight into the efficiency of the office’s ability to gain
convictions, but most participants agree that this is only one part of a
prosecutor’s role within the criminal justice system and within the community.
Additional roles include validating appropriate investigation techniques and
outcomes, protecting victims and helping them heal from their injuries,
reducing recidivist behavior, and ensuring appropriate sentences.
In
measurement science, there is a concept of balancing measures. 72 As one
example, conviction rates could be balanced by post-conviction exonerations.
Thus, no metrics exist to measure fully the recommendations implemented by
the DA’s Office in this instance.
VII. LIMITATIONS
The RCA process has been criticized for a number of reasons. 73 Four
elements have been suggested as preventing optimization of the RCA process in
further decreasing errors.74 These obstacles are not unique to healthcare, are
equally applicable to the law, and should be considered by any organization
seeking to implement an RCA process. First, the process of performing an
RCA lacks standardization from organization to organization. Second, RCA
teams are not always successful at identifying the root cause for why an event
truly occurred. Third, the causes identified in the RCA may be difficult, if not
impossible, to implement. Lastly, RCAs may be conducted independently, with
each root cause uniquely addressed, and no attempt to identify trends that could
be addressed systemically.
There were also shortcomings in the RCA as described here. Although the
Montgomery County RCA addressed a number of issues, it was not possible to
explore fully every learning or RCA precept. To solve the widest range of
issues, RCAs should include involved personnel as team members for insight
regarding the error. RCA interviews are more susceptible to recall bias, and
direct observations of workflow and processes are useful but time consuming.
Involved personnel might relate what they thought was the right answer and not
necessarily workflow as practiced. For this reason, participation should be
voluntary, with no individually-identifiable participant information recorded.
Attorneys, in particular, could add important viewpoints regarding the
sustainability and effectiveness of proposed RCA solutions. There is evidence
that staff members attribute effectiveness and sustainability to those solutions
involving training, policy, and compliance. 75 Because such recommendations
require considerable administrative resources to implement it is important to

72. See Elizabeth Martinez et al., Quality Improvement and Patient Safety, in
MILLER’S ANESTHESIA 92 (Ronald Miller ed., 8th ed. 2014).
73. See Jonny Taitz et al., System-Wide Learning From Root Cause Analysis: A Report
from the New South Wales Root Cause Analysis Review Committee, 19 QUALITY SAFETY
HEALTH CARE 63, 66–67 (2010), http://qualitysafety.bmj.com/content/19/6/e63.full.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2B2Q-LJAE].
74. See Thomas Diller et al., The Human Factors Analysis Classification System
(HFACS) Applied to Health Care, 29 AM. J. MED. QUALITY 181, 181–82 (2014).
75. See Hettinger, supra note 18, at 18–19.
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assure their effectiveness. Consequently, direct workflow observations and
cost-benefit analyses may be required to assess feasibility and ensure
effectiveness rather than mere “user satisfaction.” Lastly, to be truly effective,
RCAs should be conducted expeditiously. The ideal in some healthcare settings
is within seven days. Analyses temporally distant from errors are more likely to
introduce errors in memory, relevance, and incentives to improve.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
Application of the RCA process in a criminal justice context, as developed
in other professions such as healthcare, aviation, and fire prevention, has the
potential to produce an effective and sustained reduction of errors in the legal
system. The process starts with the differing insights and experiences that the
appropriate group of individuals brings to bear, including those with intimate
knowledge of daily workflows. The RCA team must be committed to exploring
the systems-level factors that created the error-prone environment, but with an
appreciation of just culture76 when evaluating the individuals who were
involved with a given event. This RCA may serve as a blueprint for analysis of
errors in many legal settings to determine if effective and sustainable learnings
and their implementation can be applied to reduce future prosecutorial errors.
Identifying and engineering systems-level solutions may prevent error-prone
situations, creating sustainable and effective change and leading to the fairer
administration of justice. In Montgomery County, the new positions of Deputy
District Attorney for Professional Standards and Assistant Chief for the Trials
Division are expected to provide an effective and efficient means by which to
address quality control and to ensure appropriate case outcomes throughout the
Montgomery County District Attorney’s Office. In summary, the RCA found
that front-end review and quality assessment are critical to accuracy and
fairness, while ongoing review of cases is mandatory to help ensure, at all
times, that the Montgomery County District Attorney’s Office is operating at
the highest levels of professionalism and accuracy.

76. See DEKKER, supra note 41, at 89.
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RCA Name: MDA_Evidence
Learnings

High-publicity case with potential for
political pressure and potential for
perceived conflict of interest. State AG
declined to accept case.

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
Event &Reported Date:
Action Plan

RCA Date:5/29/12
Potential
Impact

Assess alternatives to MontCo investigation Medium
Develop protocol for assigning prosecutors
and detectives to high profile cases.
Experience working independently within a
team structure and prior history with other
team members is a positive.
High
Develop supervisory team for high profile
cases, including roles - devil's advocate,
independent evidence review, definition of
"high profile"
High

Consider legislative approaches to
standardizing cases.
Law enforcement decision on where to send
victim for appropriate tests can standardize
Standardization of processing victims across
Process of gathering data was unusual
hospitals 'Name of the game, Keep things
because victim went to hospital before
the same.'
reporting allegations to police/DA. Hospital
Develop process/protocol for hospital
to hospital transfer, local rape procedures
informing Montco DA (police?) of rape kit
carried out, lab tests sent to non-MontCo
administration and results (within HIPAA)
lab.
Develop process for obtaining/archiving
duplicate samples for analysis by preferred
lab.
Points of communication about lab data
Develop process for communication with
were unusual and DA's first contact was
hospital - consent to disclose form.
from victim, who was not an expert.
Develop process for independent verification
Hospital nurse spoke to victim; victim
of victim statements.
misunderstood conversation; victim relayed Develop process for independent verification
incorrect information to county detective.
of victim statements.
Make current process more explicit, or reNeither investigator nor Asst DA
educate staff.
independently verified lab data.
Develop teams who can
anticipate/complement each other's work.
Consider meaningful evaluation of data by
someone outside investigation team (perhaps
even outside MontCo DA's office) during
investigation stage. Medical expert or
defense attorney on call to act as
No independent review within DA's Office
interpreter/devil's advocate
but outside investigation team of data
Ensure each member of investigation team is
submitted to GJ.
comfortable questioning conclusions and
actions of the other members of the team,
and reporting concerns upward
Formalize process for review of data during
investigation stage
Identify chains of communication when leaks
are a concern; 'Who do you trust?'
Protocol for who investigation team can
Media scrutiny led to communication
speak to on cases with media attention
problems.
Protocol for calls coming in inquiring about
case status to non-investigation team
personnel
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Accountable Due date
DA/1st Asst
DA

DA/1st Asst
DA

Medium

DA/1st Asst
DA
DA/MontCo
Legislative
Lobby
County
detectives

High

DA/1st Asst
DA

Medium

Hospitals

Medium

Medium

County
detectives
County
detectives
County
detectives
DA/1st Asst
DA
DA/1st Asst
DA
DA/1st Asst
DA

Medium

DA/1st Asst
DA

Medium
Medium
High
High
High

Medium

DA/1st Asst
DA
County
detectives
DA/1st Asst
DA
DA/1st Asst
DA

Medium

DA/1st Asst
DA

High
High
High

Completed Date

TABLE: DRAFT ACTION PLAN
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